Abstract. In this article, we present a comparative study of a developed new formal mathematical model of risk assessment (FoMRA) with expert methods of risk assessment in the information systems (IS). Proposed analysis verified the correctness of theoretical assumptions of developed model. In the paper, the examples of computations illustrating the application of FoMRA and known and accepted throughout the world methods of risk assessment: MEHARI and CRAMM were presented and related to a specific unit of the public administration operating in Poland.
Introduction
Continuous technological innovations and competition among existing and entering into the market organizations (firms) enable customer's access to a wider range of services and products delivered by the ICT systems [1, 2, 3] . A rapid development of the IT systems and growing acceptance of the Internet as a medium (channel) of products and services distribution, carries both benefits and risks [4, 5] . A particular risk arises from the possibility of unauthorized disclosure, modification or removal of a larger amount of a significant information without leaving traces of an unauthorized access [6, 7, 8] . A particular attention should be paid nowadays to ensure an appropriate, understandable as a secure, access to such a type of systems [9, 10] .
The choice of methods to ensure the security of the IT systems in a given organization should be relevant to the type of risk. A transparent and proactive approach to the analysis and risk management may not only minimize risk but also allows achieving a competitive supremacy of the organization [11, 12] .
Among the methods of risk assessment, a particular attention is paid to the methods, which can be represented by means of the mathematical models. One of such models has been developed by us and described in detail in [13] . The advantage of this formal mathematical model of risk assessment (FoMRA) on the background of existing models (shown below) is that, it enables the performing of risk assessment of the information system of the organization according to the ISO/IEC standards and OECD recommendations.
In this paper, a comparative analysis will be performed in order to demonstrate the correctness of the FoMRA theoretical assumptions on the background of the expert methods such as the CRAMM and MEHARI, accepted and applied by many professionals throughout the world.
Description of the risk evaluation methods
Nowadays, amongst about 200 available methods of risk assessment and risk management [14] , only few have found the acceptance of the market, including COBRA [15] , COBIT [16] , OCTAVE [17] , CRAMM [18] and MEHARI [19] . The majority of these methods is based on know-how solutions developed by the independent or governmental organizations of different countries, and is assigned for the application in the governmental systems and public service organizations. These methods are not supported by proofs based on formal mathematical models, but they are only the collections of good practices within the IT Governance [20] .
One of the first formalized methods of risk assessment for the information systems, approved as the government standard in the USA, is the Courtney method [21] . It considers the risk of information systems in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
The Courtney method, being a standard in the USA, was developed by Fisher and others [22, 23] , but Parker was the first one, who eliminated the weak points of this method [24] . These weak points, as reported recently in [25, 13] , are related to the "human factor" which influences the risk of the incident. Parker, who applied mathematical knowledge and the experience of the IT experts, has proposed the risk analysis model containing five phases as described in [24] .
The model above is an improved model proposed by Courtney. Most of elaborated quantitative, qualitative methods (graph-based, static and dynamic, relational and Markov) uses some or the majority of the assumptions of a standard model proposed by Parker [26, 27, 28, 29, 30] . These methods differ, however, in the approaches to the identification and classification of the assets, vulnerabilities and risks, the risk value assessment, the choice of countermeasures, etc. This fact makes the most of the methods presented above to move in quite different directions, even if the final goal seems to be the same [14] . In most cases, it is thus impossible to directly compare results generated by two different methods, and an indirect comparison is hard and time-consuming, even if conversion mechanisms are obtainable. The important questions thus become whether these more or less widely used methods are competent? whether they can properly describe any IT system? and whether they effectively ensure declared compliance with standards? Some answers to these questions were provided in the paper [13] we propose a formal model for risk assessment (FoMRA) based on the experience of experts who created the MEHARI method and it complies with the requirements and standards' guidelines for the security of the information systems [simplified model is presented in Section 2.1].
In this paper, the FoMRA model described in [13] , will be a subject of the comparative analysis aiming, as mentioned above, to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the model against the well-known and widely used methods of risk assessment. The experimental results of the risk analysis should confirm whether the FoMRA is meaningful, and if it truly describes any information system, and whether these results are comparable with the results obtained from other methods.
Simplified Formal Model of Risk Analysis (FoMRA)
The defined mathematical structures of the standard formal model of risk assessment (FoMRA), were used to precisely define a graph for calculating risk values [13] , and to define an algorithm of its construction. Briefly, let A be a set of some assets 1 :
 
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(1) Additionally, let us consider the following finite sets:  
..., , 1 : DP s n s dp DP   -a set of measures reducing a potentiality,
-a set of measures reducing an impact.
The above sets define classes of system assets, vulnerabilities concerning threats, classes of threats for assets, risk scenarios and measures reducing potentialities and impacts of threats resulting from assets losses.
Let us assume that there is a given and ordered set  of n-values for the arguments in IS system (according to [13] 
is a weighted value of the measure reducing the potentiality and impact of some threat. The following formula (7) shows how to calculate values for potentiality and impact actions:
where:
x -indicates the rounding down of the result x to the number belonging to the set  (to the infimum of x in this set), ─ R i -is an answer to an audit question (the value 1 or 0), ─
-is a value assigned to an i-th question, where X = DP or DI, which depends on the defined measure type j scenario s and a number of the question no(R i ) associated with the answer R i . n t dp DI  . For these specific arrays, the following sets of arrays are also determined:
The above brief description of the FoMRA complies with the fundamental requirements of the ISO standard: ISO/IEC 27005:2011 -Security techniquesInformation security risk management. The FoMRA allows to conduct completely a comparative analysis with other methods, as shown below.
Description of methods used in comparative analysis
The choice of the CRAMM and MEHARI methods for comparative analysis has been made to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the FoMRA [13] . These methods are widely accepted by the risk analysis and security management experts.
The risk value determined by the CRAMM method is dependent on assets value, threats and vulnerabilities of the system (Fig 1) . By applying this method, a list of countermeasures aiming at reducing risks in information security is created. where: ─ 1, 2 : negligible risk, ─ 3, 4 : tolerable risk, ─ 5,6 : inadmissible risk, ─ 7 : intolerable risk. ─ Depending on the risk value, CRAMM enables the selection of countermeasures from 70 groups for a given scenario, making it a dedicated method for large organizations and enterprises. In the case of the SME sector, the choice of countermeasures may not be optimal, since risk does not match the scale of the risk of failure due to the scale of the enterprise. 
V.L -Very Low, L -Low, M -Medium, H -High, V.H -Very High
According to various reviews [32, 33] , CRAMM as a commercial tool, should be used only by the experienced users, since it generates too much information, it is inflexible and slow. The full analysis can take months, instead of several days.
Unlike CRAMM, the MEHARI method is available as a Know-How knowledge base (in the Excel File) related to threats, vulnerabilities and threat scenarios assessment.
The MEHARI method is based on the knowledge of assets, vulnerabilities and threats identification and classification, and the assessment of risk levels (Fig. 2) .
Identify your main business assets

Diagnose your vulnerabilities
Assess your risks
Build your plan of action
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the MEHARI risk assessment method
To determine risk value, the MEHARI method applies tetravalent array of a risk (Tab. 2). The risk value in the MEHARI method depends on the potentiality and impact values for each of the identified risk scenarios. According to various authors [32, 33] , the MEHARI method is flexible and dedicated to small and large organizations. The disadvantage of this method is the lack of data bases of countermeasures which are reducing risks in information security systems. Moreover, new upgrade issued in the year 2012, delivering new knowledge base of vulnerabilities, threats, etc., made this method even more complicated and a little more time-consuming. Tables 1 and 2 determine the risk values estimation for each type of the organization for each of the methods mentioned above . They indicate the risk that a given organization takes into account as: (i)) intolerable (risk demanding the immediate implementation of countermeasures, despite of the organization budget and security plans), (ii) inadmissible (risk must be eliminated or minimized sooner or later, according to the established organization budget and security plans), or (iii) tolerable (low or insignificant risks -depending on the organization's security policy).
Conditions and results of the experiment
To perform a comparative analysis demonstrating the correctness of the theoretical assumptions of the FoMRA [12] , we have to:
─ establish an uniform scale of risk value array (CRAMM, MEHARI, FoMRA), ─ use the same assets, vulnerabilities, threat/risk scenarios for various methods of risk analysis. It was assumed for the analysis that the scale of risk value is in the range <1 -4>. The assumed scale is not dictated by any requirements, only for ease operation of the quantitative records (for the MEHARI method and FoMRA), dissimilar to quantitative-qualitative as CRAMM.
It was also assumed that risk values (MEHARI and FoMRA versus CRAMM) should be interpreted after transformation as follows:
─ for risk value: 1 = (1,2); 2 = (3,4); 3 = (5,6); 4 = 7 -and they correspond to the set of values given in (CRAMM and MEHARI). The scale of risk values according to the FoMRA is flexible [17] and can be matched to any of the above methods. Additionally, the following classification system was used: ─ for assets: 1 -less important, 2 -important 3 -very important, 4 -critical ─ vulnerability/threat: 1 = Very Low/Low, 2 = Medium, 3 = High, 4 = Very High The data derived from the analysis of the IT security of the administrative unit operating in Poland were used to perform the comparative analysis.
FoMRA was used to perform a pre-audit [13] which allowed to identify confidentiality (C), integrity (I), and availability (A). Table 3 shows an example of the identified CIA parameters. W , value, the results from the audit questionnaire were used. The audit concerned the implemented dissuasive measures, preventing from potential threats (measures defined in formula 5) and protective, preventive as well as palliative measures, depending on the threat type (measures reducing threat, formula 6). The questionnaire results taken from the MEHARI knowledge base [19] have been used to perform audit. Similar questionnaires are also available from the OCTAVE [17] , EBIOS [34] , CRAMM [18] , etc. One should note that the content of the audit questionnaires may not perfectly match between the analyzed methods (certain audit questionnaires from the MEHARI contain more details and higher number of implemented countermeasures as compared to the CRAMM audit questionnaires and vice versa, for the same hazard risk scenarios).
The situation may happen when one or more of the audit questionnaires will be covered in one method, while not in the other one (e.g., audit questionnaires related to the recovery measures in the MEHARI method do not have the coverage in the CRAMM method, because such measures are not taken into account there). This situation can ultimately affect the outcome of risk assessment (e.g. risk values). Table 4 shows a section of the questionnaire for the audit of dissuasive measures against theft of archives in an office for asset a 5 -written or printed information and data kept by users and personal archives, susceptibility v 3 -intentional erasure (direct or indirect), theft or destruction of a program or data containers and the threat t 2 -loss of data files or documents: theft of data media. Table 4 . Section of the audit questionnaire related to the dissuasive measures of the potential attackers against theft of archival documents
Monitoring of protected office areas
Response (0/1) Valuepi Is there a complementary video surveillance system, complete and coherent, for protected office areas, able to detect movement and abnormal behaviour? 1 4 In the case of an alarm, does the surveillance team have the possibility of sending out an intervention team without delay to verify the cause of the alarm and to take appropriate action?
Has the security team sufficient resources to cover the eventuality of multiple alarms set off intentionally? 0 4 Is video surveillance material recorded and kept for a long period? 1 1 Is the intrusion detection system itself under surveillance (alarm in the case of shutdown, video autosurveillance etc.)?
Are procedures for surveillance and intervention in the case of abnormal behaviour audited regularly? 1 2 According to formula 7, we calculate the weighted value of measures CM s,j (CM s,j =1 means that the measure is ineffective and CM s,j = 4 means that it is very effective) for each identified scenario s. The following example shows the calculation of CM s,j = dp 1 for dissuasive measures taken from table 4 (scenario s 15 -value in bold):
where: 1/0 -means Yes / No Table 5 shows the calculation of the weighted values of the CM s,j for exemplary scenarios of threats. As can be seen from the table, some of CM s, j measures have value equal to 1. This value may be the result of calculation as above or can be taken arbitrarily in the absence of such measures (scenario s 4 -bold values). For example, in order to prevent copying the application data files (s 4 ) by a potential hacker, we can only use the protective measures against copying and/or measure-reducing impacts of copying. The use of effective dissuasive measures against potential hacker (to discourage him from performing an attack) is, however, minimal or impossible. [13] were considered. Tables 6,7 and 8 illustrate all the necessary data to calculate the risk values for the selected threats in an exemplary administrative unit. Tables cover all the CIA safety parameters and types of actions using vulnerabilities AEV within FoMRA. The table also includes the results of analysis performed according to the MEHARI and CRAMM methods. During the risk assessment with the use of CRAMM and MEHARI methods, the system of resources, vulnerabilities and risks classification was used. The scale of risk values was set according to the requirements of both methods. The audit questionnaires from each of the methods were used during the analysis in accordance to the requirements described above (with the same resources, vulnerabilities, and threat / risk scenarios).
The results obtained with the use of the FoMRA for 14 out of the 21 scenarios presented in Table 7, Table 8 and Figure 5 are comparable with those obtained using CRAMM (Fig. 3) . In turn, 16 out of the 21 scenarios are comparable with those obtained using MEHARI (Fig. 4) . Analyzing the results derived from the CRAMM and MEHARI and given in Table 8 , we received comparable results, for which 14 out of the 21 scenarios overlaps.
As can be seen from Table 7 and Table 8 , from the 21 scenarios representing approximately 10% of all threat scenarios [19] , 12 overlap (they give the same results for the three methods). This result contradicts the statement made by the authors [14] that in most cases it is impossible to compare directly the results generated by two different methods.
Referring to the statement on audit questionnaires related to the recovery measures from the MEHARI method having no coverage in CRAMM method, we performed the analysis of the results from Table 7 for the weighted value, CM s, j = di 2 . Remote attack of a third organization by internal personnel using authorized connections to the organization
The analysis showed that among the 13 scenarios examined by the FoMRA, where the value of the CM s, j = di 2 > 1 (recovery measure -this means that the audited organization possesses the insurance covering some cost of property, assets, etc. damage), seven scenarios were identified (5 -Integrity, 2 -Availability) which do not match the results derived from CRAMM (Tab. 8).
Taking into account the method of a s W , evaluation, as described in details in [13] , it was observed that changes in CM s, j = di 2 for (s 1 , s 2 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 14 , s 16 ) scenarios from Table 7 , impose values changes in assigned arrays (Table 9 -CM s, j = di 2 = 1 dark gray color, CM s, j = di 2 > 1 gray).
